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ABSTRACT
This paper shows that the Russian 1998 crisis had a big impact on capital flows to Emerging Market
Economies, EMs, especially in Latin America, and that the impact of the Russian shock differs quite
markedly across EMs. To illustrate this statement, we compare the polar cases of Chile and
Argentina. While Chile exhibited a significant economic slowdown after August 1998, it did not
suffer the excruciating collapse suffered by Argentina, where even the payments system came to a
full stop. We attribute their difference to the fact that Chile is more open to trade than Argentina, and
that it appears to suffer much less from balance-sheet currency-denomination mismatch that was
rampant in Argentina before the 2002 crisis (due to large domestic liability dollarization). The paper
is essentially descriptive but is in line with and, thus, complements econometric studies like Calvo,
Izquierdo and Mejia (NBER Working Paper 10520). The final section addresses policy issues in light
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                Latin America does not grow. It occasionally hits an ice patch where output 
speeds up, only to fall on its face when the ice patch ends.  Moreover, in the glorious 
1960s when  the  region  was  hurtling along  at  high speed, it was outpaced by other 
regions, including the OECD. Thus, in contrast to advanced economies (the North), in 
which the business cycle has given way to growth as the main subject of professional 
attention,  in  Latin  America  business  fluctuations  remain  the  name  of  the  game.  
Reducing volatility and avoiding the exhilaration of the ice patch have become primary 
policy commandments. 
  Unfortunately, false starts and painful crashes have not given rise to a solid 
academic literature comparable to the one dealing with problems in the North.  Rather, 
the failure of a false start is quickly attributed to the skates used on the ice patch.  Thus, 
after the crash policymakers go quickly to the store to buy a new pair of skates instead 
of learning how to skate on an ice patch that is less than totally smooth. Instead of 
analysis and ideas, new slogans are printed on political banners declaring “the model 
has failed,” “the model is exhausted.” or other empty statements of that nature.  When 
the  Debt  Crisis  erupted  in  the  early  1980s,  politicians,  cheered  by  international 
multilateral institutions, declared the failure of Import Substitution and bought a brand 
new pair of Washington Consensus skates. Few stopped to think that the 1982 crisis in 
Latin America had systemic elements and followed a sharp increase in US interest rates 
that precipitated a collapse of capital flows to the region.
1  After the 1998 Russian crisis, 
which set off a string of Emerging Market (EM) financial crises, politicians started to 
sneak out of their Washington Consensus skates and again went shopping for a new 
pair. It is still too early to know what will be the new fashion, but some very prestigious 
ice skate producers are forcefully vying for attention! 
  Intellectual  fickleness,  however,  militates  against  credibility,  and  without 
credibility  policy  is  likely  to  be  ineffective,  if  not  counterproductive.
2    Thus,  we 
strongly believe that a deeper understanding of financial crises in the region constitutes 
one  of  the  most  productive  projects.    We  said  “productive,”  not  “easy,”  because 
typically the observer is limited by a very small number of observations relative to the 
shocks and regime changes during the observation period.    
This paper will focus on the last gasps of the Washington Consensus, which 
began to be  heard in the aftermath  of the 1998 Russian crisis. In contrast to much 
                                                
1 However, see Calvo and Borensztein (1989). 
2 See for example, Calvo (1989).   3 
current thinking, we do not fault the Washington Consensus for what it says.  Rather, 
we  fault  it  for  what  it  does  not  say,  particularly  for  ignoring  several  key  financial 
factors.  Thus, for example, the Washington Consensus ignored the key role of high 
volatility  of  international  capital  markets.  The  Washington  Consensus  also  ignored  
central characteristics of domestic capital markets in Latin America and other EMs such 
as the high incidence of foreign currency debt (Liability Dollarization). 
  We will argue that poor growth performance—and the new crop of crises in 
Latin  America  in  the  late  1990s  and  the  early  years  of  the  new  millennium—were 
largely the result of the Russian crisis, which brought about an unprecedented, across-
the-board increase in interest rates for EMs and a systemic collapse of capital flows to 
the region.  This is vividly suggested by Figure 1. Nevertheless, the implications of the 
Russian crisis for Latin America are still badly understood, and they have given rise to 




Furthermore, we will argue that the systemic collapse in capital flows, when 
combined with domestic financial vulnerabilities that acted as amplifiers of the external 
shock,  also  goes  a  long  way  towards  explaining  how  individual  countries  in  Latin 
America fared during the late 1990s: who was badly hit (Argentina), experiencing a 
major financial crisis and economic collapse with severe social consequences, and who 
suffered painful macroeconomic adjustments (Chile) but emerged largely unscathed.  
This alternative interpretation of the disappointing performance and recent crop 
of crises in Latin America in the late 1990s has very important policy implications.   4 
Once one takes into account financial factors, most of the pieces of the puzzle fall into 
place. Thus, these crises imply no momentous break from the conventional wisdom 
prevailing in the 1990s, as doomsayers would have us believe. Rather than throwing 
overboard the reform efforts of the 1990s, EMs should focus on identifying and fixing 
key “points of financial vulnerability” and reinforcing policy credibility. In turn, the 
focus of attention of the international community should be redirected to fixing the 
international financial architecture in ways that resources, financial and otherwise, can 
be mobilized in a more efficient and stable manner from central to peripheral countries.  
This topic is highly relevant because there are incipient signs of resumption in capital 
flows to emerging market economies.  Thus, it is extremely important to contain the 
seeds of future crises before they have time to germinate.   
The next section documents the boom and bust, i.e., the systemic, large and 
largely  unexpected  interruption  in  external  capital  flows  to  Latin  America  (i.e.,  a 
Sudden Stop) following the Russian crisis. As this Sudden Stop affected a very large 
number of heterogeneous countries in very different regions of the world at about the 
same time, it is very difficult to construe this Sudden Stop as the result of a coordinated 
reassessment of the economic fundamentals of individual countries or regions. Rather, 
we argue that the root cause of the Sudden Stop lies in developments in the central 
financial  markets.  Section  II  describes  the  anatomy  of  Latin  America’s  painful 
macroeconomic adjustment and sharp reduction in growth rates following the Sudden 
Stop in capital flows. Special attention is paid to the case of Chile, as Chile suffered a 
severe Sudden Stop in capital flows and a painful macroeconomic adjustment in the 
aftermath of the Russian crisis, in spite of its very solid economic fundamentals and 
tight controls on capital inflows. However hard the landing and painful the adjustment, 
the  Chilean  economy  experienced  no  financial  crisis  and  did  not  collapse  as  did 
Argentina’s economy. In Section III we use the comparative experiences of Chile and 
Argentina after the Sudden Stop in capital flows in the aftermath of the Russian crisis, 
to address the key domestic financial vulnerabilities that acted as amplifiers of the initial 
external financial shock, transforming an otherwise painful macroeconomic adjustment 
into a full-blown financial crisis and economic collapse. Section IV concludes with 
some reflections on policy.   5 
 
I.  Life after Russia, or the Chronicle of a Sudden Stop 
 
The 1990s was a decade of formidable economic expansion of the US economy. The 
revolution  in  information  and  communications  technology  produced  an  investment 
boom, and investment in the US rose at an average rate of 6.7 percent between 1991 and 
2000, compared to 3.7 percent in the previous decade. This investment was stimulated 
by both the emergence of new firms and the incorporation of new technologies into 
existing firms. As a result, the US economy saw formidable advances in productivity 
that led to a boom in stock market values: the Dow Jones multiplied by four and one 
half and the NASDAQ by fourteen between October 1990 and early 2000. This huge 
increment  in  financial  wealth  also  precipitated  an  equally  large  increment  in  the 
financial resources available for firms and households. 
Emerging  economies  were  direct  beneficiaries  of  this  enormous  increase  in 
investment and financial resources. Starting in 1989-90 there was a huge increase in 
capital  flows  to  emerging  economies,  in  the  form  of  both  direct  investment  and 
financing.  According to IMF figures, net capital flows went from 29 billion dollars in 
1989  to  227  billion  dollars  in  1996,  when  they  reached  their  peak,  an  eightfold 
increment in a very short period of time. This huge wave of capital inflows to EMs in 
the first half of the 1990s makes the previous wave of inflows that occurred between 
mid-1970s and the early 1980s pale by comparison. We believe that the year 1989 could 
justifiably be considered the beginning of financial globalization in the modern era.  
By  the  end  of  the  1980s,  with  the  implementation  of  the  Brady  Plan,  Latin 
American countries were on the verge of finally resolving the 1980s debt crisis and 
hence renewing their access to international capital markets. As a result, Latin America 
also benefited from the huge wave of capital inflows that started in the early 1990s. As 
illustrated in Figure 2, external capital flows to the major Latin American countries 
(henceforth LAC-7), which all but vanished after the debt crisis of the early 1980s, 
jumped from minus 13 billion dollars (or minus 1.1 percent of GDP) by the year ending 
in IV-1989 to 100 billion dollars (or 5.5 percent of GDP) in the year ending in  II-1998.
3 
                                                
3  LAC-7  includes  the  seven  major  Latin  American  economies,  namely,  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. These countries represent 93 percent of Latin America’s GDP. 
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At  their  peak,  external  capital  flows  to  LAC-7  were  financing  24  percent  of  total 
investment in the region.   7 
 
This new wave of capital inflows was not only large, but also widespread, as 
illustrated in Table 1. Cheap and abundant capital and financing were pouring into every 
country  in  the  region.  At  their  peak  in  mid-1998,  net  capital  flows  to  LAC-7  had 
increased by close to 7 percentage points of GDP relative to 1989, and the swing was 
positive  and  significant in  every  country.  This  highly  synchronized  and  widespread 
increase in capital inflows to a variety of very diverse countries suggests that the root 
cause of this bonanza must lie in common external factors, i.e., developments in central 
rather than in peripheral countries.
4  However, external does not necessarily mean that 
capital inflows are independent of domestic fundamentals. This important and subtle 
difference is precisely the topic of Section III. 
A key feature of the 1990s was that non-FDI financial flows to Latin America 
were in the form of portfolio flows, while other emerging markets, such as the emerging 
Asian countries, were mainly recipients of bank loans. Calvo (2002) suggests that a 
relevant factor could have been the creation of a secondary market for sovereign bonds 
in Latin America as a result of the Brady Plan, which transformed bank loans into 
bonds. The Brady debt reduction plan, which mostly focused on Latin America, created 
for the first time a critical mass of long-term bonds that needed to be managed and 
traded  by  specialists.  The  creation  of  this  market  allowed  fund  managers  of  risky 
portfolios  to  include  Latin  American  risk  and  made  it  worthwhile  to  invest  in 
information on Latin American economies; expanding investors’ interest in the region 
as their knowledge of the region grew.   
Mexico’s Tequila crisis in 1994-95 produced only a temporary reversal in capital 
flows  to  Latin  America,  and  its  effects  were  limited  in  scope,  mainly  affecting 
Argentina (see Figure 2). However, a key lesson learned from the Mexican experience 
was that countries were financially more fragile than previously thought: even if their 
long-term capacity to pay was sufficient to cover obligations, they could be rendered 
insolvent if a critical mass of investors refused to roll over short-term bonds (Mexico) 
or bank deposits (Argentina). In such a situation, investors could rationally refuse to 
lend, and a crisis would ensue.
5 
                                                
4 The role of external factors in explaining inflows and outflows of capital and economic performance in 
emerging economies has been emphasized in Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993). 
5 See Calvo (1998). 
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The second crisis episode was the Asian crisis of 1997. This crisis hit countries 
with  very  high  saving  rates  and an  impeccable  record  of  high  growth.
6    It  became 
apparent that liquidity crises were also a possibility not only in the case of bonded debt, 
but  also  in  the  case  of  bank  lending,  whether  intermediated  through  the  domestic 
banking system or directly allocated to local firms. However, not even the Asian crisis 
interrupted the exponential increase in capital flows to Latin America. Rather, the Asian 
crisis hit Latin America through trade channels by depressing commodity prices: non-
fuel commodity prices fell by nearly 30 percent from their peak in II-1997 to their 
trough in early 2002. This decline in commodity prices contributed in some specific 
cases, notably Chile and Peru, to a deceleration in growth rates. 
It was Russia’s default in August 1998, however, that represented a fatal blow 
for Latin America. This default precipitated a sudden, synchronized, large and persistent 
increase in interest rates for EMs. In tandem with the rest of emerging markets, interest 
rate spreads for LAC-7 rose from 450 basis points prior to the Russian crisis to 1,600 
basis points in September 1998, more than tripling the cost of external financing in a 
period of weeks. As a result, capital inflows to LAC-7 countries came to a Sudden Stop, 
falling from 100 billion dollars (or 5.5 percent of GPD) in the year ending in II-1998 
prior to the Russian crisis, to 37 billion dollars (or 1.9 percent of GDP) one year later 
(see Figure  2).
  The sudden reversal  is  explained  by the collapse  in non-FDI  flows, 
which fell by 80 billion dollars during that period.  
After the initial blow, capital flows to LAC-7 suffered an additional blow after 
the Argentine crisis in 2001 (which, as we will argue, was triggered by Russia’s crisis) 
and, later, the ENRON scandal that had a major—albeit temporary—effect on both US 
junk bonds and emerging markets.
7 By the year ending in IV-2002 capital flows to 
LAC-7 were less than 10 billion dollars, back to the very low levels of the late 1980s.  
The  Russian  virus  affected  every  major  country  in  Latin  America,  with  the 
exception of Mexico (see Table 1).  Even Chile, a country with very solid economic 
fundamentals—a track record of sound macroeconomic management, a highly praised 
and sustained process of structural and institutional reforms that completely transformed 
and modernized Chile’s economy, and an average rate of growth of 7.4 percent per year 
                                                
6 In the aftermath of the devaluation of the Thai currency in July 1997, capital flows to emerging Asian 
countries, i.e., Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, fell from 47 billion dollars (or 4.3 
percent of GDP) in the year ending II-97, to minus 58 billion dollars (or –5.5 percent of GDP) one year 
later.  
7 For a brief analysis of the relationship between the ENRON scandal and emerging market bond spreads 
see Calvo and Talvi (2002).   9 
between 1985 and 1997, the highest growth rate in LAC-7—and tight controls on the 
inflows  of  foreign  capital,  experienced  a  sudden  and  severe  interruption  in  capital 
inflows. In fact, the Sudden Stop in Chile in the year following the Russian crisis was 
7.9 percent of GDP, the largest in LAC-7.  
That  a  partial  debt  default  in  Russia,  a  country  that  represented  less  than  1 
percent  of  world  GDP  and  had  no  meaningful  financial  or  trading  ties  with  Latin 
America, could precipitate a financial contagion shock wave of such proportions, posed 
a puzzle for the profession. In our view, the kind of explanation that is consistent with 
the evidence, i.e., a sudden, synchronized and widespread increase in interest rates for 
EMs, is that financial contagion was caused by the impact of Russia’s crisis on the 
balance  sheet  of  financial  intermediaries  investing  in  emerging  markets.  These 
intermediaries  were  highly  leveraged,  and  the accumulation  of losses after  Russia’s 
default led to a liquidity crunch, forcing a sell-off of EM bonds across the board at fire 
sale prices to meet margin calls.
8 In fact, during the Russian crisis big players in the 
central capital markets were subject to a liquidity crunch, prompting the Fed and the 
ECB to lower interest rates as a result. Unfortunately, however, liquidity relief came 
only when the crisis threatened the stability of US and European markets—too late to 
restore confidence in EMs. 
An alternative systemic explanation for the widespread effect of the Russian 
crisis is Reverse Moral Hazard.  According to this explanation, the IMF refusal to bail 
out Russia sent a strong signal to the market that the IMF would no longer support 
blanket bailouts. This, in turn, increased the perceived risk of investing in EMs and 
orchestrated a run on EM securities.  Reverse Moral Hazard is complementary to the 
one relying on liquidity crunch in the central capital market and, furthermore, reinforces 
the view that EMs were badly hit by the Russian crisis.  Although this is not the place to 
engage on a debate about the relevance of the Reverse Moral Hazard view, we believe 
that  this  view  is  highly  debatable,  given  that  the  IMF  has  since  arranged  generous 
packages for Brazil and Turkey.
9 
To be fair, there is another possible interpretation for the reversal in capital flows 
in the 1990s, and this view lays the blame on domestic reform. Some critics of the 
reforms of the early 1990s, such as Stiglitz (2003), argue that the global financial crisis 
                                                
8 For a theoretical explanation of this kind of contagion see Calvo (1999a) and Calvo and Mendoza 
(2000). For empirical evidence supporting this class of explanations see Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001 
and 2003). 
9 See Calvo (2002).   10 
was itself the product of capital market liberalization, which was an integral part of the 
reform agenda of the 1990s. Although one could argue that the opening of the capital 
account could have facilitated destabilizing capital flows (i.e., “hot money”), this does 
not explain the synchronized nature of the reversal in capital flows that occurred in 
Latin America in 1998.  Moreover, those who find fault with an open capital account 
will be hard-pressed to explain why capital flow reversal also took place in countries 
that had imposed controls on capital inflows, like Chile. 
In summary, the deterioration in international financial conditions for emerging 
economies  and  the  consequent  interruption  in  capital  flows  to  a  variety  of  very 
heterogeneous countries—in  terms  of  exchange  rate  regimes,  capital  controls, fiscal 
stance, track record of structural and institutional reforms and growth performance—
was so sudden, synchronized and widespread that it appears implausible to argue it was 
caused by a sudden and coordinated reassessment of the economic fundamentals of 
individual countries in the region.
10 Rather, a more straightforward explanation is that 
the dramatic increase in interest rates for Latin American economies and the ensuing 
interruption in capital flows was the result of a disruption in international financial 
markets in the aftermath of Russia’s default. 
 
 
II.  Sudden Stops and Macroeconomic Adjustment in Latin America 
 
The Sudden Stop in capital flows precipitated a very severe and painful macroeconomic 
adjustment and a sharp reduction in economic growth in Latin America.
11 The anatomy 
of  this  adjustment  in  LAC-7  is  illustrated  in  Figure  3.  The  following  are  its  main 
characteristics.   
                                                
10 The diversity in the degree of advancement of structural reforms has been extensively documented in 
Lora (2001). 
11  This  represents  a  “hard  landing,”  to  use the  term  that,  paradoxically,  currently  is  associated  with 
concerns regarding the size of the external current account deficit of the US economy (5 percent of GDP) 
and  fears  that  a  change  in  market  sentiment  (a  Sudden  Stop?)  might  force  a  major  macroeconomic 
adjustment in the US.   11 
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1.  A very large and persistent increase in the cost of external financing and a 
collapse in asset prices  
 
The increase in interest rate spreads and the cost of external financing for LAC-7 was 
not only large—spreads tripled in a matter of weeks—but also persistent: it took nearly 
five years for spreads to return to the levels prevailing prior to the Russian crisis (see 
Figure 3a). 
Such a severe tightening in monetary and credit conditions in such a short period 
of time has no parallel in developed countries. It should come as no surprise that it 
resulted  in  a  severe  drop  in  asset  prices.  LAC-7  stock  markets,  which  had  already 
started to decline after the Asian crisis, collapsed by an additional 48 percent from their 
relative peak in II-1998 to their trough in IV-2002, after experiencing a ten-fold increase 
between 1991 and 1997 (see Figure 3b). 
 
2.  A Sudden Stop in external financial flows and domestic bank credit and 
sharp financial deleveraging  
 
The dramatic tightening in monetary and credit conditions, both external and internal, 
and  the  reduction  in  the  value  of  collateral,  signaled  that  current  debt  levels  were 
unsustainable. The result was a Sudden Stop in external financial flows and domestic 
bank credit flows which did not merely decline but in fact turned negative. As a result, 
the Sudden Stop was accompanied by a very sharp and persistent financial deleveraging 
on the part of LAC-7 households and firms.   
External financial  flows  (i.e., non-FDI  capital flows) experienced a dramatic 
turnaround in the immediate aftermath of the Russian crisis, falling from 40 billion 
dollars in the year to II-1998 to minus 40 billion one year later, and they have remained 
persistently negative since then. This means LAC-7 countries have been transferring net 
financial  resources  abroad,  in  sharp  contrast  with  the  period  preceding  the  Russian 
crisis.  As a result, external financial flows fell from a cumulative total of 200 billion 
(real) dollars between I-1990 and II-1998 and to a cumulative total of 120 billion (real) 
dollars by the IV-2002, a reduction of 40 percent (see Figure 3c).
12  
                                                
12  Real dollars are 2003 dollars, using the US CPI as a deflator.   13 
Domestic bank credit flows to the private sector also came to a Sudden Stop and 
actually turned persistently negative (see Figure 3d). As a result, financial deleveraging 
also took place at the domestic level in LAC-7: domestic bank credit to the private 
sector declined by 20 percent in real terms (see Figure 3d). It took a very protracted 
period of financial deleveraging and a substantial improvement in international financial 
conditions  (i.e.,  a  large  reduction  in  US  interest  rates)  for  interest  rate  spreads  of 
emerging economies and the cost of external financing to return to pre-Russian levels in 
early 2003. However, capital flows to LAC-7 recovered only slightly in 2003 and 2004 
and still remain substantially below their previous heights. 
  To understand this apparent puzzle it is important to stress the nature of the 
shock  and  the  corresponding  adjustment.  Borrowing  in  international  markets  can 
smooth an adverse shock to current income, such as a fall in the terms of trade.  Such a 
shock  would  be  associated  with  a  deteriorating  current  account  and  an  increase  in 
inflows  of  foreign  capital.  However,  the  type  of  shock  experienced  by  the  Latin 
American economies in the aftermath of the Russian crisis is not an adverse income 
shock  but  an  adverse  shock  to  the  capital  account,  i.e.,  a  shock  to  the  cost  and 
availability of capital and credit. This type of shock is by definition undesirable if not 
impossible to smooth. On the contrary, it induces a major adjustment in the stocks of 
debt, which under the new and tighter conditions are too “expensive” to sustain. It is 
precisely  this  adjustment  in  debt  stocks  or  deleveraging  on  the  part  of  firms  and 
households that allows for an endogenous reduction in the cost of external financing. 
However,  the  endogenous  reduction  in  the  cost  of  external  financing  can  only  be 
sustained by lower stocks of debt and, in turn, lower capital inflows. 
The Sudden Stop in capital flows and external financial deleveraging (or the 
transfer of net financial resources abroad) had its counterpart in a sharp current account 
adjustment and real currency depreciation. The current account of LAC-7 went from a 
deficit of 5 percent of GDP in the year ending in II-1998 to a surplus of 1.3 percent of 
GDP in the year ending in IV-2002, an adjustment equivalent to 6.3 percentage points 
of GDP (see Figure 3e). During the same period, the real value of domestic currencies 
in  LAC-7  vis-à-vis  the  US  dollar  depreciated  by  70  percent  (see  Figure  3f).  As 
illustrated in Table 2 the adjustment in the current account and currency values was 
highly synchronized: every country in LAC-7—with the notable exception of Mexico—
experienced large current account adjustments and currency depreciation during this 
period.   14 
 
3.  Severe and sustained contraction of investment and a sharp reduction in 
economic growth 
 
The  other  side  of  the  coin  of  financial  deleveraging  and  the  large  current  account 
adjustment was a severe and sustained reduction in investment levels. To see this, let us 
consider how the stocks of debt in the balance sheets of households and firms can be 
reduced.  There  are  essentially  three  ways.  First,  for  any  given  level  of  investment, 
households and firms must forego consumption in order to increase savings and hence, 
increase the resources available to reduce debt levels. Alternatively, for any given level 
of savings, households and firms must reduce investment in order to use part of their 
savings to reduce debt levels. Finally, debt levels can be reduced through negotiated 
debt restructuring with creditors.  
Although in practice the three modes of balance-sheet adjustment are typically 
observed,  the  reduction  in  investment  in  LAC-7  has  played  a  major  role  in  the 
adjustment  to  tighter  international  financial  conditions.  Investment  declined  by  18 
percent in the immediate aftermath of the Russian crisis, and by the fourth quarter of 
2002  still  showed  no  signs  of  recovery  (see  Figure  3g).  Investment  growth  rates 
collapsed from an average of 9 percent per year between 1991 and 1997 to minus 5 
percent per year between 1999 and 2002, and investment ratios fell from 23 percent of   15 
GDP in 1997, prior to the Russian crisis, to 18 percent of GDP in 2002, a reduction of 5 
percentage  points.  In  fact,  it  was  the  reduction  in  investment  ratios,  rather  than  an 
increase  in  saving  rates,  that  made  the  largest  contribution  to  the  current  account 
adjustment. 
As was the case with the slowdown of capital flows, the collapse in the growth 
rates of investment and investment ratios was also synchronized and widespread and 
affected every single country in the region (see Table 3). In fact, with the sole exception 




Not  surprisingly,  growth  in  LAC-7  also  experienced  sharp  reduction.  GDP 
growth fell from an average of 4.4 percent per year between 1991 and the year ending in 
II-1998, when international financial resources were abundant and cheap, to 0.5 percent 
between 1999 and 2002 after the Sudden Stop (see Figure 3h). Again, the reduction in 
growth  rates  was  both synchronized  and widespread.  As Table 3 illustrates,  growth 
reversals occurred in every country of the region, ranging from 11 percentage points in 
Argentina and 6 percentage points in Chile and Venezuela, to 1.5 and 0.1 percentage 
points in Brazil and Mexico, respectively.   
 
The Chilean Experience 
As noted, Chile was also affected by a severe Sudden Stop in the aftermath of the 
Russian  crisis  and  experienced  a  hard  landing  as  a  result.  The  anatomy  of  Chile’s   16 
macroeconomic  adjustment  following  the  Sudden  Stop  was  qualitatively  and 
quantitatively a carbon copy of the average Latin American country described above. 
Figure 4 illustrates its main characteristics. 
In the aftermath of the Russian crisis, Chile also suffered a large and persistent 
increase in the cost of external financing and a collapse in asset prices and currency 
values. Interest rate spreads more than tripled, albeit from lower levels than those of the 
average LAC-7 country, from 120 basis points prior to the Russian crisis to 390 basis 
points in October 1998 (see Figure 4a).   
The tightening in monetary and credit conditions further resulted in a severe 
drop in asset prices: the stock market in Chile collapsed by 37 percent between II-1998 
and IV-2002 compared to 48 percent in LAC-7, after having already experienced a 
substantial decline since the Asian crisis (see Figure 4b).  
The severe tightening in monetary and credit conditions and the reduction in the 
value of collateral also precipitated in Chile a Sudden Stop in external financial flows 
that actually turned negative. As a result, the Sudden Stop was accompanied by a sharp 
and persistent external financial deleveraging on the part of households and firms. After 
the Russian crisis, external financial flows fell from a cumulative total of 20 billion 
(real) dollars to a cumulative total of 10 billion dollars a 47 percent reduction (see 
Figure 4c).  Likewise, domestic bank credit flows to the private sector came to a Sudden 
Stop but turned negative for only a brief period of time (see Figure 4d). Although the 
stock of bank credit continued to grow, it did so at substantially lower rates. Bank credit 
growth declined from an average of 13.5 percent in the period I-1991 to II-1998 to 2.9 
percent in the aftermath of the Russian crisis. 
Chile, like the average LAC-7 country, also required a very protracted period of 
external financial deleveraging and a substantial improvement in international financial 
conditions  (i.e.,  a  large  reduction  in  US  interest  rates)  in  order  for  its  interest  rate 
spreads and the cost of external financing to return to pre-Russian crisis levels. 
The Sudden Stop in capital flows and external financial deleveraging in Chile 
also  had  its  counterpart  in  a  sharp  current  account  adjustment  and  real  currency 
depreciation.  The current account went from a deficit of 6.5 percent of GDP in the year 
ending  in  II-1998  to  virtual  balance  one  year  later,  a  similar  adjustment  to  LAC-7 
overall but in a shorter time span (see Figure 4e).  From June 1998 to December 2002, 
Chile’s currency depreciated by close to 50 percent vis-à-vis the US dollar, compared to 
70 percent in LAC-7 (see Figure 4f).   17   18 
 
Finally, as in the average LAC-7 country, Chile’s financial deleveraging and 
large  current  account  adjustment  were  obtained  through  a  severe  and  sustained 
reduction in investment. Investment declined by 23 percent in the immediate aftermath 
of the Russian crisis, and by the fourth quarter of 2002 it was still 12 percent below its 
pre-Russian  levels  (see  Figure  4g).  Between  1999  and  2002  average  growth  in 
investment was negative, and the investment ratio fell from 27 percent of GDP in 1997, 
prior to the Russian crisis, to 21 percent of GDP in 2002; this reduction of 6 percentage 
points explains the bulk of the current account adjustment (see Table 2). The drop in 
investment ratios was associated with a correspondingly sharp reduction in growth rates 
(Figure 4h). Growth in Chile fell from an average of 8 percent per year between 1991 
and 1997 to 2 percent per year between 1999 and 2002, after the Sudden Stop.  
In summary, the evidence strongly suggests that the poor growth performance of 
the  region  in  the  late  1990s  and  early  2000  is  the  result  of  the  macroeconomic 
adjustment set in motion by the Sudden Stop in capital flows following Russia’s crisis. 
As credit  dried  up and existing degrees of leverage could not  be sustained, LAC-7 
economies went through a protracted period of relatively low investment as households 
and firms adjusted their balance sheets to the new situation. Every major country in 
LAC-7 was affected to a greater or lesser degree (with the notable exception of Mexico 
who  is  tightly  linked  to  the  US  business  cycle),  including  Chile,  by  far  the  best 
performer in the region. 
 
 
III.  From Macro-Adjustment to Financial Crisis and Economic Collapse:  
           The Polar Cases of Chile and Argentina 
 
However hard the landing and painful the adjustment, the Chilean economy experienced 
no financial crisis and economic collapse, as did Argentina’s economy. This is puzzling 
in light of the fact that the Sudden Stop in capital flows in Chile and Argentina from II-
1998  to II-2001—the period prior to  the  beginning of the bank run in Argentina—
displayed a similar time pattern and if anything, was larger in Chile than in Argentina 
(see Figure 5).  
A cold spell affects different people in different ways: some catch a mild cold, 
while others end up at the hospital. Clearly, the outcome will depend on the physical 
strength or fragility of the person affected. Similarly, a Sudden Stop in capital flows   19   20 
originating  in  external  factors  can  have  a  very  different  impact  depending  on  the 
strength or the vulnerability of each economy. 
In this section we identify two key domestic factors that contribute to attenuate 
or  intensify  the  effects  of  a  Sudden  Stop.  These  are:  trade  openness  and  Liability 
Dollarization.
13    In  what  follows  we  discuss  the  mechanisms  through  which  these 
factors operate, focusing on the case of Argentina. 
 
1.  Openness 
 
As we showed in the previous sections, a Sudden Stop in capital flows was typically 
accompanied  in  the  average  LAC-7  country  (Chile  included)  by  a  rapid  and  large 
adjustment in the current account, and by a large real  depreciation of  the  domestic 
currency.  
Openness is an essential link in the chain mapping an external liquidity shock to 
a financial crisis and an economic collapse. The reason is that the change in the real 
exchange rate to accommodate a Sudden Stop in capital flows is larger in a closed 
economy than in an open economy.
14 
As illustrated in Table 4, Chile’s economy prior to the Russian crisis and the 
Sudden Stop was approximately 50 percent more open than that of Argentina if we use 
the  share  of  tradables  in  GDP  as  our  measure  of  openness:  Chile’s  tradable  sector 
averaged 35 percent of GDP compared to 24 percent in Argentina for the period 1991-
1997 prior to the Russian crisis.
15  Although Argentina’s current account deficit prior to 
the Sudden Stop was smaller than Chile’s (4.7 percent as opposed to 6.5 percent), due to 
its relatively closed economy Argentina would have required a larger real depreciation 
than  Chile  in  order  to  eliminate  the  current  account  deficit.  This  is  so  because 
                                                
13 Calvo, Izquierdo and  Mejía (2004) perform formal econometric tests on the role  of  openness and 
financial dollarization as determinants of Sudden Stops. 
14  For a formal proof in the context of a simple model see Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003). The 
intuition is that in the short run, i.e., when the supply of tradables is relatively fixed, an adjustment of the 
current account of any  given size requires a larger proportional reduction  in  domestic absorption  of 
tradables the smaller the supply of tradables relative to domestic expenditure of tradables. Under standard 
assumptions  of  preferences  (homotheticty),  the  absorption  of  non-tradables  must  fall  by  the  same 
proportion as tradables. In the short  run, i.e., when the supply of non-tradables is relatively fixed, the 
required change in the equilibrium real exchange rate will be larger, the smaller the supply of tradables 
relative to domestic expenditure on tradables. 
15  The share of tradables in GDP is proxied by the participation of the primary and manufacturing sectors 
in GDP. Traditional measures of openness, i.e., the share of imports plus exports as a share of GDP, 
averaged 56 percent in Chile and 19 percent in Argentina for the period 1991-1997, prior to the Russian 
crisis.   21 
Argentina’s current account deficit, when measured in percent of imports prior to the 
Sudden Stop, was 60 percent larger than Chile’s. Hence, Argentina may have required a 
real depreciation of 75 percent after the Sudden Stop if we scale Argentina’s required 
depreciation  to  Chile’s  observed  depreciation  (and  assume  that  the  elasticity  of 
substitution in consumption between tradables and nontradables is about the same in 
both countries). Let us recall that Chile eliminated its current account deficit and its 
currency depreciated by 48 percent after the Sudden Stop.
16  
Under normal circumstances, a real devaluation would be part of the solution for 
an economy that requires substantial external adjustment. However, under extensive 
Liability Dollarization a large devaluation was bound to be part of the problem, not part 
of the solution.  
 
2.  Liability Dollarization  
 
Figure 6a illustrates that private debt in Argentina was highly dollarized.
17  Prior to the 
Sudden Stop, 80 percent of private debt, whether domestic or foreign, was denominated 
in US dollars compared to 38 percent in Chile. The high dollarization of private debt 
implied large financial mismatches in the balance sheets of Argentinean households and 
firms,  since  only  25  percent  of  productive  activities  are  in  the  tradable  sector,  and 
therefore,  potentially  capable  of  generating  earnings  in  hard  currency.  In  contrast, 
Chile’s tradable sector is much larger (the share or tradable goods in GDP prior to the 
Sudden Stop was 35 percent) and similar in size to the share of dollar debts in total 
                                                
16 See Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) for a formal derivation of the relative size of the required real 
depreciation by Argentina and Chile to eliminate the current account deficit. 
17 Private debt is defined as domestic bank credit to the private sector plus foreign lending to the non-
financial domestic private sector.   22   23 
private debt. Hence, the aggregate balance sheet of Chile’s private sector was likely to 
be much less sensitive to movements in the real exchange rate.
18 
In the presence of these very large financial mismatches, a real devaluation of 75 
percent in Argentina implied a huge revaluation in the value of private debts. For the 
typical debtor, with 80 percent of its liabilities denominated in US dollars and one 
quarter of its income generated in US dollars, the ratio of the stock of debt relative to 
income would be expected to increase by 35 percent. For a debtor whose income was 
100 percent in local currency the situation would be even worse: the ratio of debt to 
income would be expected to rise by 61 percent (see Figure 6b). 
Let us pause for one second to stress why a large expected real devaluation and 
the  implied  revaluation  of  private  debt  stocks was  bound  to  create  severe  financial 
stress. After the Sudden Stop, interest rate spreads for emerging economies skyrocketed 
and the value of collateral plummeted, signaling the unsustainability of outstanding debt 
stock. This situation was bound to be exacerbated by currency devaluation (another 
consequence  of  Sudden  Stop),  by  increasing  private  debt  ratios  even  further.    This 
“double  whammy,”  namely,  the  sharp  rise  in  external  financing  costs  and  the 
revaluation in the stock of private debt, forces a much larger adjustment in debt stocks 
and sets in motion a potentially disruptive credit crunch (i.e., the inability to roll over 
existing stocks of debt) that could strangle investment and production.  
Even  if  only  the  group  of  firms  with  balance  sheet  mismatches  runs  into 
financial trouble, i.e., is hit by the inability to rollover its stock of debt, much of the rest 
of the economy becomes suspect. This is the case because, in most market economies, 
inter-enterprise  credit  plays  a  prominent  role  in  business  transactions.  In  such  an 
environment, credit to firms whose debts would have automatically been rolled over is 
conditioned  on  passing  more  in-depth  viability  tests.  The  latter,  in  turn,  is  a costly 
information-gathering  exercise,  and  more  so  during  a  crisis,  because  it  requires 
information about the inter-enterprise credit network to which the firm in question is 
connected.  Like highway congestion caused by an accident, which can stop the flow of 
traffic, this may represent a major negative supply shock.
19 
Under  these circumstances  of severe financial  stress,  the  public  sector  could 
have been part of the solution by, for example, “collateralizing” private debts (as Korea 
                                                
18 For micro evidence on the absence of any significant balance sheet mismatches in Chile see Cowan, 
Hansen and Herrera (2004). 
19 See Calvo (2000) for a discussion.   24 
did  in  1997),  by  implicitly  offering  future  tax  revenues  as  collateral  to  prevent  or 
mitigate the credit crunch of the private sector. But Argentina’s public sector was bound 
to be part of the problem, not part of the solution. Close to 100 percent of Argentina’s 
public debt, domestic and foreign, was denominated in US dollars, compared to 44 
percent in Chile (see Figure 6c).  Thus, a real devaluation of 75 percent—which, as 
argued above could have been called for by the Sudden Stop—would be expected to 
result in an increase of the public debt/GDP ratio from 54 to 93 percent (see Figure 6d). 
In  order  to  sustain  those  higher  levels  of  public  debt  under  tighter  external 
financial conditions, Argentina’s public sector would have been required to significantly 
increase  its  primary  surplus  in  a  sustained  and  credible  manner  to  the  tune  of  3 
percentage  points  of  GDP  (or  15  percent  of  government  expenditures).
20  Since 
government expenditures largely consist of wages and pensions it is close to impossible 
for a democratically elected government to engineer explicitly such a reduction through 
the normal budget process.
21 The alternative, i.e., to increase taxes on the private sector 
at the time when the private sector was also experiencing a severe credit crunch, simply 
meant plugging one hole by opening another. Clearly, the expected revaluation of debts, 
both private and public, was a national problem, and the private sector could not be 
counted on to bail out the public sector through higher taxes, and the public sector could 
not be counted on to bail out the private sector by socializing private debts. Under these 
circumstances, the credit crunch would be felt simultaneously by both the private and 
the public sector. Given the sheer magnitude of the problem caused by the “double 
whammy”  and  the  inability  to  continue  rolling  over  existing  stocks  of  debt,  it  was 
unlikely that the adjustment in debt stocks would not have been expected to include 
some kind of debt restructuring, both public and private. 
Let us now turn to the banking sector, a major factor in spreading the crisis 
across the economy.  In the case of Argentina, bank assets consisted primarily of loans 
to the private and public sectors.  Thus, financial trouble of the sort described above 
implied a severe deterioration of the quality of banks’ loan portfolio.  As it became 
increasingly  clear  that  the  Sudden  Stop  was  systemic  and  persistent,  and  that  a 
realignment  of  the  exchange  rate  in  Argentina  was  bound  to  be  large  and  close  to 
                                                
20 See Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003). 
21 Adjustments of this size, and even larger, in public sector wages and pensions have been regularly 
observed in Latin America. However, they are typically engineered through an “inflationary shock” that 
dilutes the real value of nominal wages and pensions rather than through an explicit decision of the 
government through the budgetary process. 
   25 
inevitable, the seeds of a bank run were sown. From the perspective of depositors, there 
was nobody around to bail them out in the event of a large devaluation, and therefore 
they ran for the exits. From February to December 2001, when the “corralito” was 
implemented, Argentina’s banks lost close to 50 percent of their deposit base.
22 The 
bank run exhausted the central bank’s international reserves, and the worst nightmare 
finally came true: the Convertibility regime, i.e., the fixed one-to-one peg to the US 
dollar,  was  abandoned  and  the  peso  experienced  a  very  large  depreciation.  Not 
surprisingly, bank credit to the private sector also collapsed, along with the deposit 
base, and there was a huge collapse of investment and economic activity. GDP and 
investment fell by 25 percent and 70 percent, respectively, from (the year to) III-1998 to 
(the year to) III-2002, when they reached a minimum (see Figure 6e). 
Before concluding this section, a note on the Convertibility regime is in order. 
Many economists believe that had Argentina decided to abandon Convertibility and 
devalue its currency early on, the protracted recession and ultimate financial crisis and 
economic collapse could have been avoided or largely attenuated. Chile’s case is often 
cited as an example of a country that recognized early on that the currency needed to be 
adjusted in the aftermath of the Sudden Stop and successfully did so. 
Although we acknowledge these Keynesian elements might have played a role 
in the early stages or Argentina’s recession, they are not at center stage in explaining the 
ensuing collapse. Contrary to popular opinion, we believe that whatever the flaws of the 
Convertibility regime (and there may be many),
23 the exchange-rate regime was a side 
show  in  this  crisis.  Had  the  Argentinean  authorities  decided  to  abandon  it  by 
engineering an early devaluation  of the currency in  the  immediate  aftermath of the 
Sudden Stop, the financial crisis would have occurred earlier. This is the case because 
the key problem was the real devaluation per se (and the revaluation of private and 
pubic debts it implied). In our view, the delay in abandoning the Convertibility regime 
and in recognizing (what turned out to be) an inevitable realignment of the Argentinean 
currency was not the main cause of the crisis. Rather, the crisis was the consequence of 
Argentina’s very high Liability Dollarization and the large real devaluation required by 
the  Sudden  Stop.  This  explains  why  devaluation  of  the  Argentinean  currency  was 
delayed until it became patently obvious that there was no other choice. 
                                                
22 The “corralito” was the popular name given to the prohibition dictated by the government to withdraw 
money from bank accounts, except for very small and predetermined weekly amounts. 
23  See Calvo (1999b).   26 
  
IV.  Reflections on Policy 
 
The  recent  crop  of  crises  in  emerging  economies  has  revealed  the  importance  of 
external financial factors, confirming once again the findings in Calvo, Leiderman and 
Reinhart  (1993).    Therefore,  this  section  will  discuss  policy  responses  to  systemic 
shocks originating in international financial markets.  We first offer some remarks on a 
variety  of  crisis  prevention  policies  that  have  taken  center  stage  in  current  policy 
debates,  namely,  self-insurance,  capital  controls,  the  exchange  rate  regime  and  de-
dollarization.  In addition we discuss the role of trade policy in crisis prevention, which 
emerges naturally from our previous analysis. We will then discuss the role of fiscal and 
interest rate policy in dealing with the crisis after it has occurred. Finally, we conclude 
this section with some brief remarks on what can be done at the global level to prevent 
or reduce the likelihood of systemic financial shocks affecting EMs. 
 
Crisis Prevention Policies 
The relevance of systemic shocks—shocks that apply to more than one EM economy at 
a time—became apparent after the 1998 Russian Crisis, which brought about a Sudden 
Stop (of capital inflows) in several countries, despite Russia’s small role in trade and 
financial  markets.    What  can  a  single  country  do  to  offset  such  a  negative  shock?  
Typically, policymakers come forward asserting that their country is different—and, 
typically, this does not work.  Multilateral financial institutions also join the chorus in a 
typically vain attempt to stave off a crisis, only to be quickly and rudely dismissed by 
the market (unless they are prepared to put enough money on the table).  As we will 
discuss  below,  standard  policies  are  not  very  effective  either.    Credit  dries  up,  so 
expansive  fiscal  policy  is  unfeasible  (unless,  once  again,  multilateral  financial 
institutions or generous donors come forward with the necessary finance).  Low central 
bank interest rates do not generate more credit (unless the central bank is prepared to 
spend its international reserves).  In sum, standard policy is not effective unless some 
form of new credit is made available.  
What can an individual country do to attenuate the effects of systemic crisis 
prior to crisis? Here the options are more varied, although by no means easy or costless. 
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1.         Self Insurance.  Let us focus on a Sudden Stop, i.e., a credit crunch suffered by 
the country as a whole.  If the government is over-indebted, the public sector is part of 
the problem. However, if  public debt is small, then the public sector could help to 
ameliorate the credit squeeze by tapping multilateral financial institutions and putting 
up  future  tax  revenue  as  collateral  (as  Korea  did  in  1997);  or,  equivalently,  by 
employing its international reserves (as Hong Kong and Brazil did in 1998 and 2002, 
respectively).    These  observations  suggest  the  following  policy  alternatives  prior  to 
crisis: (a) contingent credit lines from private/public international institutions, and (b) a 
War Chest of international reserves.  We will now say a few words about them. 
 
(a)  Contingent  Credit  Lines.    They  are  effective  complements  to 
international reserves, and were implemented by Argentina and Mexico.  
However,  these  lines  tend  to  dry  up  as  crisis  looms.    Moreover,  the 
amounts  are  typically  insufficient  to  prevent  a  sharp  current  account 
adjustment. 
 
(b)  War  Chest.    This  is  becoming  a  popular  idea.    The  example  that  is 
usually mentioned is the Chilean Copper Stabilization Fund, which is 
supposed to grow during the expansion phase of the business cycle, and 
fall  during  downswings.    The  Chilean  system  does  not  fully  address 
systemic  shocks,  since  in  principle  the  latter  are  not  necessarily 
correlated with domestic business cycles.  However, the basic idea is the 
same:  minimize  adjustment  costs  during  downturns,  and,  especially, 
avoid having to implement tight fiscal policy during recessions.  One 
problem  with  War  Chests  is  that  the  ruling  party  may  have  strong 
incentives to violate its operating rules and sacrifice the War Chest for 
the  sake  of  popularity  at  the  polls.    This  observation  is  particularly 
relevant for a case in which the War Chest is created to bail out the 
banking system.  In that case the sums involved could amount to 20-30 
percent of GDP.  Thus, we feel that a War Chest is unlikely to stand on 
its own.  It will likely have to be complemented with Contingent Credit 
Lines, because the latter involve third parties that could better ensure 
compliance with operating rules. 
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A problem faced by the types of policies described above is moral hazard.  Anticipating 
a  bailout,  the  private  sector  will  likely  change  its  behavior,  possibly  offsetting  the 
effects of the bailout.  Thus, bailouts must be made costly, especially for those agents 
who will be their direct beneficiaries.
24  
2.  Capital Controls.  There are few other topics that are as badly understood as the 
effect of capital controls on the probability of financial crises, more specifically, Sudden 
Stops. A common, and misleading, intuition is that if one prevents short-term (“hot”) 
capital from flowing in, then capital will not gush out, and a Sudden Stop will thus be 
prevented.  Plausible as it may sound, this intuition is wrong for more than one reason.  
In the first place, capital outflow can take place even in the absence of capital inflow.  
For example, exporters could keep export proceeds in a foreign bank instead of bringing 
them home, and multinational firms could increase the rate of profit repatriation or use 
financial transactions that imply capital outflows to hedge the risks of immobile assets 
in  their  balance  sheets.    Second,  a  Sudden  Stop  entails  lower  capital  inflows,  not 
necessarily capital outflows.  Thus, a Sudden Stop would take place if Foreign Direct 
Investment, FDI, slows down (as happened in Peru in 1998), even though FDI is the 
polar opposite of hot capital.  This shows, incidentally, that not even effective controls 
on  capital  outflows  (as  in  Malaysia  in  1997)  could  prevent  Sudden  Stop.  Third, as 
shown in previous sections, empirical evidence cast serious doubts on the effectiveness 
of controls on capital inflows.  After 1998, Chile suffered the largest Sudden Stop in 
Latin America, despite having consistently, and for an extended period of time, imposed 
controls on capital inflows.  Furthermore, it is possible to conceive of circumstances in 
which the imposition of controls may exacerbate the extent of a Sudden Stop, because 
the government would have revealed its predisposition to meddle with the market. 
3.  Exchange Rate Regime.  This is another topic where confusion is king.  Some 
seem to think that crises could be entirely wiped out if the exchange rate was free to 
float.  This is an extreme view, and an easy one to dismiss.  However, it is perhaps fair 
to say that most observers believe that pegged exchange rates are dangerous for EMs.  
Interestingly, while the debate leans against fixed exchange rates, accession countries in 
Europe are eagerly queuing up to join the euro, and China—with a splendid sustained 
growth record—has pegged its currency to the US dollar since 1995.  Moreover, not 
even  the  pro-floaters  appear  to  be  disturbed  by  the  fact  that  economies  so 
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geographically diverse as the regions of the US have only one currency, and are proud 
and happy to do so.  Although California has gone through a deep recession in recent 
years we have never heard a respectable pro-floater say that what California needs is to 
issue a new currency and devalue! 
Exchange rates have recently been discussed in Calvo and Mishkin (2003), and 
we have little to add here.  The bottom line is that exchange rates are a sideshow.  Issues 
like institutions and credibility take the center stage.  Sudden Stop episodes involve a 
sharp drying up of credit, bringing about severe domestic repercussions, especially if 
the  economy  is  highly  “Liability  Dollarized”  (i.e.,  foreign  exchange-denominated 
debts). Under those circumstances, a floating exchange rate is of little help and may 
even aggravate the crisis. Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004) show that the probability 
of  a  Sudden  Stop  increases  with  Liability  Dollarization  (more  precisely,  Domestic 
Liability Dollarization, i.e., foreign exchange debts to the domestic banking system), 
while the exchange rate regime does not appear to be a contributing factor. 
4.   De-dollarization.  As  noted,  Liability  Dollarization  appears  to  increase  the 
chances of a Sudden Stop.  Thus, the question arises, is there a way to remove the 
dollarization  scourge?    We  probably  reflect  conventional  wisdom  on  this  matter  in 
saying that Liability Dollarization is likely a consequence of many years of monetary 
mismanagement.  Thus, it is unlikely that it will go away as a result of actions taken by 
present policymakers, unless there is an assurance that future policymakers will not 
revert to business as usual. Forceful de-dollarization on the other hand, is likely to result 
in a drastic shrinkage of the financial system and a reduction in the maturity of deposits.  
A possibility that has received some attention is to try to steer the domestic 
financial system away from indexing to a foreign currency and towards some domestic 
price  level.  A  successful  example  in  Latin  America  is  the  Chilean  UF  (Unidad  de 
Fomento).  In Chile most financial and formal-sector wage contracts are UF-indexed.  
This allowed Chile to carry out a large real devaluation after 1998 without disrupting 
the domestic capital market.  Can this be replicated in other countries, and is this always 
a desirable policy?  The first part of the question does not have a promising answer.  In 
the first place, Chile was never heavily dollarized; even so, it took about 30 years to 
make the UF operational.
25,26 As to the second part of the question, “Is it desirable?” we 
do not have a good answer yet.  Financial problems arise when there is a mismatch 
                                                
25 See Landerretche and Valdes (1997). 
26 Bolivia recently attempted to adopt an UF-type system to de-dollarize its banking system to no avail.   30 
between the denomination of assets and liabilities at financial institutions and/or firms 
in general, and Liability Dollarization is a clear case of mismatch in the non-tradables 
sector.  But any index is likely to be imperfect when the economy is faced with a large 
change in relative prices.  Thus, for example, as a result of Sudden Stop housing prices 
are likely to show a precipitous fall.  Since the index will only partially reflect housing 
prices, mortgage obligations are bound to surge relative to housing values—causing 
financial difficulties, as households will have much lower incentives for honoring their 
housing financial obligations. 
5.  Trade Policy.  As noted above, given the current account deficit, the change in 
relative prices brought about by Sudden Stop is in inverse relation to the degree of 
openness. Thus, the larger the tradables sector, the less likely that a Sudden Stop will 
generate  serious  financial  problems.    Actually,  for  the  purposes  of  this  discussion 
“tradables” are goods that could be quickly transformed into exports when there is a 
collapse in domestic demand.  Thus, a better term for “tradables” in this context is 
“exportables.”  Evidence  of  exportability  is  offered  by  Chile  after  the  1998  Russian 
crisis: exports in Chile contributed to 50 percent of the current account adjustment. In 
sharp contrast, in Argentina 98 percent of the current account adjustment after 1998 
(and prior to the bank run in II-2001) was triggered by a reduction in imports. 
These observations provide new support for trade opening. Here the argument is 
not the standard one in trade theory, in which issues like comparative advantage or 
product variety are at center stage.  Rather, the argument is that economies with a large 
exportables sector will exhibit stable real exchange rates—thus lowering the deleterious 
incidence of Liability Dollarization. What is important in this context is that tradable 
goods can quickly be transformed into exports—and for this, availability of trade credit 
is essential. Recent episodes, however, show that trade credit can dry up as quickly as 
other types of credit. This is very disconcerting because one would expect exports to be 
good  collateral  for  international  creditors.  Recent  conversations  with  bankers  and 
policymakers in Brazil and Uruguay, however, indicate that exports’ value as collateral 
is jeopardized by the expectation of disarray after a Sudden Stop. For example: (a) 
strikes and social upheaval may prevent exports from reaching the port, making them 
non-exportable, (b) the government may impose foreign exchange controls that either 
impede the repayment of external debt or make it extraordinarily onerous. Therefore, 
under those circumstances, to make tradable goods exportable the government will have   31 




Post- Crisis Policies 
The debate on how fiscal and interest rate policy should be conducted after crisis has 
been heated. Should fiscal and monetary policy be tight, as usually recommended by the 
IMF?  Or  should  these  policies  be  loose,  as  recommended  by  authors  like  Joseph 
Stiglitz, a harsh critic of IMF policies during the Asian crisis?
28 Although we do not 
intend to resolve the striking differences of opinion on this issue here, some comments 
are in order. 
1  Fiscal Policy.  If the government does not have the resources or cannot access 
the capital market, there is little the public sector can do to alleviate the situation.  Thus, 
under these conditions, it would be impossible to implement expansive fiscal policy.  
This,  incidentally,  does  not  imply  that  tight  fiscal  policy—beyond  what  is  strictly 
required by capital market conditions—is desirable either.  The only exception would be 
if tight fiscal policy improves the economy’s credibility and facilitates capital market 
access by the private sector.
29  This is hard to determine in practice, but we believe that 
the success of super-tight fiscal policy depends on whether the crisis is systemic or 
localized.    If  the  crisis  is  systemic,  then  super-tight  fiscal  policy  is  likely  to  be 
unnecessarily  contractionary,  undermining  policy  credibility  and  aggravating  the 
crisis.
30  On the other hand, if the crisis is localized, then fiscal super-adjustment might 
help, particularly if it is accompanied by generous funding from multilateral financial 
institutions or it takes place during a favorable phase in the capital market for EMs. 
2  Interest Rate Policy. Low interest rates are likely not to be implementable unless 
the country has a War Chest, Contingent Credit Lines or a generous transfer from the 
international community.  However, as with fiscal policy, there is the question of how 
tight monetary policy should be.  Furman and Stiglitz (1998), for example, are skeptical 
                                                
27 The central bank of Brazil extended credit to the export sector in 2002, in the midst of a Sudden Stop 
that was partly provoked by uncertainty regarding the political transition about to take place in December. 
28 See Stiglitz (2002). 
29 This was the strategy followed by Argentina in August 1996, when Minister Cavallo was fired by 
President Menem, and the new minister (Roque Fernandez) had to show he was a fiscal conservative vis-
à-vis the capital market.  The strategy seems to have been successful, but partly because external financial 
conditions were favorable, as will be discussed below. 
30 We conjecture that the failure of Argentina’s 2000 fiscal adjustment program had a great deal to do 
with the fact that it was carried out in the midst of the Sudden Stop that affected many EMs after the 1998 
Russian crisis.   32 
of super-tight monetary policy; and we agree, especially after Sudden Stops.  A Sudden 
Stop  breaks  the  link  between  domestic  and  international  credit  markets,  at  least 
momentarily,  thus  making  it  possible  for  super-tight  monetary  policy  to  be 
contractionary.
31  Therefore, policymakers have to sail the narrow stretch between the 
Scylla  of  contraction  and  the  Charybdis  of  inflation  and  monetary  disarray—by  no 




Our previous discussion suggests that even under the best of circumstances systemic 
shocks cannot be entirely palliated by domestic policy.  Is there something further that 
can be done at a global level to prevent a systemic shock? 
The answer to the question depends, of course, on the causes of systemic shocks.  
Take, for example, the case in which credit to EMs dries up as a result of a liquidity 
crunch at the center of the capital market, a leading explanation for the spread of the 
1998  Russian  crisis.
32  In  such  a  case  the  obvious  solution  is  to  relieve  the  global 
liquidity  crunch  by, for  example,  lowering  US  and  EU  interest  rates  (as  eventually 
happened after the Russian crisis). The problem is that US/EU central banks are not 
supposed  to  react  to  liquidity  problems  that  affect  other  economies.  Thus,  liquidity 
relief may arrive when the systemic shock is already in full swing and has already 
caused irreversible damage in EMs. This demonstrates the need to creating a global 
central bank to manage global liquidity problems.  Unfortunately, however, a moment’s 
reflection  shows that such a project is fraught with forbidding regulatory  problems, 
stemming from national sovereignty constraints. A more modest proposal is the creation 
of an Emerging Market Fund, EMF, which would attempt to stabilize the price of EM 
bonds in case of a global liquidity crunch.
33  
The  main  difference  between  these  proposals  and  current  international 
arrangements is that IMF liquidity assistance in the event of a credit crunch to EMs is 
targeted at individual countries, rather than at financial intermediaries suffering from a 
                                                
31 Calvo and Coricelli (1992) discussed this issue in regard to the IMF 1990 Poland stabilization plan, 
where monetary  policy was extraordinarily tight.  For example,  on January  1,  1990, the start of the 
stabilization program, the National Bank of Poland increased interest rates in zlotys from 7 to 36 percent 
per month!  Calvo and Coricelli (1992) argue that this policy was responsible for the sharp output decline 
in 1990, because Poland had no access to international capital markets (hence, it was operating under 
conditions similar to those that prevail under Sudden Stop). 
32 See Calvo (1999a).   
33 See Calvo (2000) for a discussion.  
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liquidity  crunch.  A  global  Central  Bank  or  EMF,  in  contrast,  would  mitigate  the 
liquidity crunch of financial intermediaries in EM bonds. This is akin to the actions 
undertaken by a Central Bank when confronted by a bank run that would result in a 
credit crunch as banks recall their outstanding loans to repay depositors: liquidity is 
directly provided to the banks and not to the bank’s individual debtors. 
 Other proposals to mitigate the impact of systemic shocks emphasize the role of 
multilateral institutions in fostering the development of financial instruments to allow 
for  a  more  efficient  international  risk  sharing.  One  such  proposal,  advanced  by 
Eichengreen  and  Hausmann  (2003),  intended  to  attenuate  the  incidence  of  Liability 
Dollarization claims that multilateral institutions should lend a portion of their funds to 
EMs in inflation-indexed instruments denominated in their own currency. Multilateral 
institutions in turn would issue debt instruments denominated in an inflation-indexed 
basket  that  would  be  placed  with  institutional  investors.  The  implied  basket  would 
suffer less from idiosyncratic risk and, therefore, may enjoy higher liquidity than the 
country-specific bonds.  
Proposals such as the SDRM (a sort of international bankruptcy proceedings 
sponsored by the IMF) or the inclusion of collective action clauses in sovereign bond 
issues, are intended  to an  efficient resolution of  a sovereign debt crisis once it has 
occurred. Such mechanisms for orderly restructurings of sovereign defaults have several 
limitations  that  have  been  extensively  discussed  by  the  international  financial 
community. For our purposes it is sufficient to say that proposals along these lines could 
have positive features but would not necessarily result in crisis-prevention.   34 
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